Optimal liability for offensive and defensive AI
EconomicsLawPublic Policy
THE AI ANGLE
pricing liability and safety guardrailsJoshua Gans wrote a paper about the optimal liability for AI providers whose services serve both attack and defense. The research shows how liability rules balance security payoffs against productive exclusion and competition levels.
THE TEACHING ANGLE
Students should analyze how changing provider liability rules alters the economic balance between offensive and defensive cybersecurity efforts.Read the original at marginalrevolution.com Generate teaching or study materials
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