When Does Randomized Oversight Align AI Agents That Can Conceal? -- by Joshua S. Gans, Richard T. Holden

Economists modeled randomized audits for AI agents that can conceal misconduct and alter records. They found that stronger auditing causes undeterred violations to be hidden better. Effective deterrence requires lowering gains from violations or limiting ways to erase evidence.

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